

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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C. What would be the Chinese Communist reaction to the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China?— the Soviet reaction? — the effect on Sino-Soviet relations?

Chinese Communist Reaction.

In the actual event of identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, followed by UN retaliation against the Chinese Communists, it would be expected that the Chinese Communists would resist vigorously and to the full extent of their capabilities.

1. They would redeploy their interceptor aircraft from present concentrations around Korea to provide maximum air defense.
2. Existing AAA defenses and radar warning facilities would be brought to bear against any UN attacking aircraft. Principal Chinese coastal cities, supply centers, airfields, communications centers, and some other targets are now equipped with AAA and radar.
3. The Chinese Communist Air Force would probably attempt to strike against UN forces which may be located on Taiwan or in Southeast Asia or such UN fleet units as may be within range.

Soviet Reaction.

The Soviets would surely step up the supply of all types of air material, including additional aircraft, to the Chinese Communists. It is estimated that so long as UN attacks do not jeopardize Communist control of China no Soviet forces will be made available. Should Communist control in China be threatened the Soviets might commit forces to the air defense of China in the form of "volunteers."

Sino-Soviet Relations.

The retaliatory action of the UN would cause no basic change in the present Sino-Soviet relations which are in reality a working arrangement existing between the Kremlin and Mao's subservient regime in China. The decision for further aggression in Southeast Asia will have been made well in advance and the only effect in their relations would be a further tightening of the ties between the Kremlin and Peiping.

TOP SECRET

D. What would be the psychological and political effect within Communist China of the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China itself:

1. If such counteraction were limited to naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selective targets?

In the assumed circumstances, the Chinese Communist regime would react psychologically by using the Western military counteraction as a basis for intensification of the established propaganda line that the Western "imperialists" are determined to destroy the Chinese and other "democratic" peoples. Politically, the regime would impose increasingly rigid governmental controls on the people.

The initial popular Chinese reaction would be neutral or hostile, depending largely on the direct personal effects of the Western military counteraction. The Chinese people directly affected by aerial bombardment could be expected to demonstrate some form of violent emotion most probably a combination of fear and hatred of the Western "Barbarians." As the UN's counteraction continued, the popular Chinese reaction would be conditioned principally by the degree to which successful execution by the UN of its counteraction might invalidate the effect of increased Communist controls and propaganda. Although the assumed limited UN counteraction might result in an increase in the hopes of the Chinese people for eventual release from Communist controls, there would not be a significant increase in popular support for anti-Communist guerrillas. It is felt that the most important result as the UN retaliatory action continues would be a growing desire on the part of the Chinese that UN bombing be stopped and that the blockade be lifted.

2. If such counteraction included a general air offensive including the use of atomic weapons?

In these circumstances, the psychological and political reactions of the Chinese Communist regime would be still more drastic than in the event of a more limited Western counteraction and Communist propaganda would be intensified to capitalize upon the increased propaganda opportunities

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

provided by the Western use of atomic weapons.

Information available indicates these reactions would be of minor significance and that it should first be observed that the weight and nature and time of the retaliatory action will determine the reaction of the Chinese Communists. Further, it appears that the time has past when a small effort involving small losses can be carried out or when a small effort might materially upset Communist control in China. Therefore, the effort must be large, effective, and determined. As time goes by the size of the effort required to control Chinese expansion will increase.

TOP SECRET

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